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With What Kind of Science Should Action 
Research Be Contrasted? 
John Shotter 
Action research is often criticized for not being properly based in objective 
facts or for not formulating testable theories, in short, for not being properly 
scientific. But with what kind of science should it be contrasted? Hanson 
(1958) distinguishes between finished, (classical) sciences and research sci-
ences. Unlike a finished science that can be conducted by us as individuals 
within an already well formulated disciplinary discourse, a research science 
cannot. If it is to inquire into possibilities not yet actualized, it must be con-
ducted in a much more situated, conversational manner. Thus as researchers, 
instead of functioning as detached observers, seeking to discover the invisible
or ‘hidden’ causes of an observed event, we must operate in an ongoing real-
time situation in a much more dialogical manner. For such dialogically-
structured activity can, within the dynamics of its unfolding, give rise to tran-
sitory understandings and action guiding anticipations of a ‘situated’ kind, 
thus enabling all those involved in such activity to ‘go on’ with each other in 
unconfused ways. It is this participation in a shared grammar of felt, moment 
by moment changing expectations that are – in the interests of a decontextual-
ized objectivity – precluded (or ‘lost’) within the disciplinary discourses of a 
finished science. Thus, guided by Wittgenstein’s (1953) writings in his later 
philosophy, I want to show in this article that, not only is it more accurate to 
compare action research with research sciences than with classical sciences, 
but that action research can find its intellectual legitimacy in the same sphere 
of human conduct as all of our sciences – in people being responsibly ac-
countable for their own actions to the others around them in terms of their 
immediate relations to their shared surroundings. 
Key words: Wittgenstein, the background, ways of seeing, action guiding 
anticipations 
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This special issue of the IJAR is aimed at improving the understanding of ac-
tion research (AR) within the academic social science community. Again and 
again we find that mainstream social scientists have little knowledge of, and 
almost no experience with, action research. However, in discussions on AR, 
they still feel free to make judgements as to its inadequacies and to make au-
thoritative pronouncements on what they suppose the ‘proper’ nature of re-
search should be. This results not only in many misunderstandings and/or si-
lences between mainstream social scientists and action researchers, but (of-
ten) leaves action researchers also feeling treated as intellectually inferior to 
those engaged in ‘proper’ research, and uneasy in being observed by them. 
Indeed, it is easy for practitioners to feel that, although there is a crying need 
for their skills, their more ‘pure’ colleagues on the side-lines will surely, with 
their 20/20 hindsight in their ‘after-the-fact’ analyses, always find fault in 
what they ‘did for the best’ in the circumstances in which they worked. This 
unhappy state of affairs is has gone on for far too long.  
But more than the political tensions and uncomfortable emotions in-
volved, there are two other consequences of even greater importance: (1) One 
is that the classical paradigm of scientific research, based in a Cartesian-
Newtonian vision of the world in which we live, is still prevalent in much re-
search in the social and behavioural sciences. And this has, due to its ‘theory-
driven’ nature, diverted our attention away from the nature of our practices.
Thus the whole realm of practice has remained relatively unexamined and 
thus intellectually impoverished – in treating practice as merely the realm in 
which theories are ‘applied’, the realm of practice has been left to ‘take care 
of itself’, so to speak. Only recently have efforts been made in the academy 
to remedy this fact (e.g., Schatzki 2002; Schatzki et al. 2001). Indeed, most 
crucially, we are now beginning to see that our practices are a part of ‘the 
background’ (see the next section below) that makes our theoretical, repre-
sentational forms of talk possible. (2) There is also a second consequence: 
While the undoubted successes of ‘scientifically’ conducted research can be 
cited in academic arguments in support of ‘classical’ research methods, it is 
difficult to assess the disadvantages of such ‘scientifically’ conducted re-
search without the existence of a visibly-rational account of a competing 
mode of disciplined inquiry in terms of which to construct reasoned contrasts. 
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My aim, then, in this article, is not to set out a comprehensive intellectual 
justification for action research, but to show: (1) following Hanson (1958), 
that unlike classical, ‘finished’ sciences rooted in and modelled on “past sci-
entific achievements” (Kuhn 1962, 1970: 10), a research science must be 
rooted in the same forms of accountable human communication that ground 
all our practical dealings with each other in our daily lives, and (2) that re-
search conducted in accord with classical modes of ‘scientific’ analysis re-
sults in ‘losing the phenomena’, i.e., the modes of informal conversational 
communication that are crucial to the conduct of our everyday human affairs. 
Foregrounding our ‘background’ practices 
Although we are always immersed in them, like the proverbial fish being the 
last to discover water, it is only recently, with the work of such thinkers as 
Wittgenstein (1953), Merleau-Ponty (1962), Garfinkel (1967), Bakhtin (1981, 
1986), and Voloshinov, (1986), amongst others, that the character of the 
spontaneously occurring forms of talk and action, of speaking and listening, 
of practical understanding, etc., routinely at work in our everyday, conversa-
tionally-structured activities, has come to our intellectual attention. In all our 
classical accounts of scientific method, our everyday life practices have re-
mained unnoticed, in the background. The hope has been that, one day, our 
understanding of human phenomena will have advanced sufficiently to ‘ex-
plain’ them (in terms of a representational theory). Gradually, however, with 
the work of Searle (1981), Taylor (1993), and Dreyfus (1991), ‘the back-
ground’ is beginning to be foregrounded in our intellectual inquiries. 
Searle (1981), for instance, describes its nature thus: “The Background is 
a set of nonrepresentational mental capacities that enable all representing to 
take place. Intentional states only have the conditions of satisfaction that they 
do, and thus only are the states that they are, against a Background of abilities 
that are not themselves Intentional states. In order that I can now have the In-
tentional states that I do I must have certain kinds of know-how: I must know 
how things are and I must know how to do things, but the kinds of “know-
how” in question are not, in these cases, forms of ‘knowing that’” (Searle 
(1981: 142). While Wittgenstein (1980: 16) remarks: “Perhaps what is inex-
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pressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the back-
ground against which whatever I could express has its meaning.” 
In my estimation, it is the great power of Wittgenstein’s ‘philosophy’ that 
he has outlined a set of methods that enable us to come to an understanding 
of a least some aspects of our activities in this sphere, to grasp the nature of 
some of our own human ‘doings’ from within the middle of our doing of 
them. His philosophy, then, is of a practical-descriptive kind: that is, rather 
than being aimed inwards towards thinking, prior to any action, about which 
features in a particular subject-matter we should approach or address in our 
inquiries, it is aimed outwards toward helping us become more actively atten-
tive towards previously unnoticed aspects of our surroundings of possible 
relevance in the shaping of our actions.  
This, clearly, is a very different kind of goal from the theoretical goals 
pursued in the classical, metaphysical philosophies of the past. Indeed, he 
wants in his investigations “to replace wild conjectures and explanations by 
the quiet weighing of linguistic facts” (1981, no. 447)1 thus to produce 
merely a description of the facts that matter in the issue concerned – a de-
scription which, if one was initially intellectually disoriented, if one did not 
know what was possible as a next practical step, would justify saying to those 
around one (at least for the immediate practical purposes in hand): “Now I 
know how to go on” (1953, no.154). His investigations are thus, not at all 
aimed at developing explanatory theories to the nature of the world around us 
and of our possible knowledge of it, but at alerting us to what in fact is occur-
ring in our involvements with each other, and with our surroundings (which 
makes such theorizing possible) –  a perceptual rather than a cognitive aim. 
In other words, he works – like an action researcher – from within our al-
ready existing practices with the aim of seeking previously unnoticed open-
ings for their further refinement, elaboration, and correction. 
In an earlier very short article (Shotter 2004), aimed at outlining Wittgen-
stein’s philosophical practice and its relation to action research, I noted 
Greenwood’s (2002: 117) account of academic social sciences as “primarily 
internally regulated, university based, professional activities” that “privilege 
                                          
1 From now on, all date only citations are from Wittgenstein’s works. 
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‘theory’ and ‘method’ over all else... [in ways that were] quite out of step 
with the meanings of these terms in the physical and natural sciences” (ibid. 
119). And I noted that he went on to conclude: “From what I have written, it 
seems that action research should dominate the social sciences. It has meth-
ods that are far more ‘scientific’ in the sense of knowledge tested and refined 
in action. It mobilizes relevant knowledge from people in a position to know 
their condition far better than conventional research can with its extractive 
approach... And it is driven by strongly-held democratic values” (ibid. 128 
f.). And I agreed with him. 
Why doesn’t it then in fact occupy a dominant position in the social sci-
ences? Greenwood suggests two reasons: “suppression by the social sciences 
and political elites and the sloppiness and negligence of action researchers 
themselves” (ibid. 129). However, in my earlier article I suggested, and want 
to suggest even more forcibly here, that while what Greenwood suggests may 
be to an extent true, there is, I think, a third still more central reason, a reason 
that motivates both the suppressive tendencies he noted, as well as the lack of 
intellectual rigour of action researchers themselves: it is, as Wittgenstein 
(1953) suggests, that we are victims of the “bewitchment” (no. 109) that our 
use of words can work on us. In other words, unnoticed by us, but present in 
our ‘official’, everyday, taken-for-granted ways of spontaneously communi-
cating with each other, are ways of ‘looking at’ (perceiving), thinking about, 
acting toward, talking of, and valuing what we take the ‘things’ around us to 
be which could quite easily be otherwise than we currently take them to be. 
Hanson’s Wittgensteinian philosophy of research sciences 
In a moment, I will turn to Wittgenstein’s more general investigations into 
the unnoticed, background influence of the words we use in shaping our 
thought and talk in our more everyday affairs, our spontaneous ways of ‘mak-
ing sense of’ events in our surroundings, but here let me focus on Hanson’s 
(1958) account (as a student of Wittgenstein’s) on the background ways of 
looking, thinking, and speaking into which we are trained as scientists. For he 
wants to argue that that kind of training might not have been as useful to us 
as is often claimed. 
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Hanson’s focus on our ways of seeing 
Hanson (1958: 1) begins his inquiries by noting that philosophers “have re-
garded as paradigms of physical inquiry not unsettled, dynamic, research sci-
ences like microphysics, but finished systems, planetary mechanics, optics, 
electromagnetism and classical thermodynamics.” And it is the methods of 
such finished or ‘classical’ sciences as these that have been taken as para-
digmatic of how a ‘proper’ science – a science that all will agree qualifies for 
that title – should be conducted. Indeed, as he goes on to note, past philoso-
phers of science have often suggested that “‘when micro physics settles down 
it will be like these polished systems’”(ibid. 1), thus nothing is lost, it seems, 
in taking them as our guides in inquiring into how research should in fact be 
conducted. But this is a mistake, he says, and if this attitude is accepted, the 
more disorderly, the more unruly, conversational aspects of microphysics as
a research science will be lost. Indeed, as Hanson (1958) notes, although 
‘classical’ sciences “are not research sciences any longer, ... they were at one 
time.” Thus: “Distinctions which at present apply to them ought to be suspect 
when transferred to research disciplines: indeed, these distinctions afford an 
artificial account of the kinds of activities in which Kepler, Galileo and New-
ton themselves were actually engaged” (ibid. 1). In other words, to look at the 
history of the now ‘classical’ sciences through the lens of their ‘finished’ na-
ture might be to distort, or to lose, the very phenomena responsible for the 
processes leading to their successful development.2
                                          
2  Interestingly, Kuhn (1962, 1970) later took this very approach to The Structure of Sci-
entific Revolutions that Hanson had suggested was mistaken: he took already estab-
lished sciences as being of central importance. As he saw it, the function of such para-
digms was in the conduct of what he called normal science – where research is “firmly 
based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particu-
lar scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its 
further practice” (ibid. 10). And it is the study of these paradigms (of finished sciences 
– Hanson) that, he said, “mainly prepares the student for membership in the particular 
scientific community with which he will later practice” (ibid. 11). Thus in Kuhn’s 
(1970: 52 f.) view – with his interest in the history (but not the philosophy) of scien-
tific revolutions – training scientists in normal or finished sciences is central, because 
such a training can give rise to “paradigm induced expectations”; and: “Discovery 
commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition that nature has 
somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science. It 
then continues with a more or less extended exploration of the area of anomaly” (ibid. 
 With What Kind of Science Should Action Research Be Contrasted? 71
In short, all the human phenomena involved in, and surrounding, our in-
quiries into possibilities (many of which are, ultimately, not realized) are lost. 
In the interests of achieving an objective, decontextualized, generalized ac-
count, independent of any unique events or unique individuals, all the fleet-
ing, only “once occurrent events” (Bakhtin 1993: 1), in which we conduct 
exploratory orientations toward the yet-to-be- determined phenomena con-
fronting us, are eradicated. Such ‘relational experiments’ – for they are to do 
with the tentative adoption of different ways of relating ourselves to the oth-
ers and othernesses3 around us – are, as Hanson (1958) shows, a crucial part 
of a research science. But the need for, and role of, such orientational explo-
rations can play no part in such polished and finalized accounts of what a 
‘proper’ science is.
However, as Hanson (1958) cautions, in outlining what is involved in 
studying dynamic, research sciences, “the issue is not theory-using, but the-
ory-finding.” Thus, he says: “let us examine not how observation, facts and 
data are built up into general systems of physical explanation, but how these 
system are built into our observations, and our appreciation of facts and data” 
(ibid. 3).  
What Hanson brings into the foreground of our consideration, then, is not 
only how all the attitudes, compulsions, urges, inclinations, etc., that usually 
lie in the background of our research activities which can – without our real-
izing it – influence what we see, and our ways of talking and acting in rela-
tion to what we see. But even more importantly, how, in the moment of our 
looking over what is before us, someone’s talking (and their other activities, 
such as pointing and gesturing) can be intertwined into our looking to help us 
organize what we see into a unity. For, as we realize, we do not ‘take’ pic-
tures with our eyes in an instant as a camera takes pictures; our eyes, in their 
saccades and fixations, dart about within a visual field as we ‘look over’ it, 
and thus we gather only fragments of data here and there. To integrate or to 
organize them into a visual unity or whole – the seeing a ‘something’ within 
                                          
52 f.). Kuhn’s account of the workings of a research science as thus very different 
from Hanson’s. In Kuhn’s terms, Hanson’s scientists are inevitably functioning in a 
pre-paradigmatic realm of inquiry. 
3  That is, the ‘still undetermined somethings’ awaiting a linguistic designation. 
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a ‘situation’ – we require a way of looking, a way of sequencing our looks 
such that the seeing of one aspect of a whole arouses in us an expectation 
that, were we to look for another aspect of it, there is a chance of finding it 
present also. 
In other words, there is an extra-sensory element in vision, an organized 
way of looking that leads us, as we ‘look over’ a visual scene, to ‘see that’ it 
is an X rather than a Y that is before us. It is his concept of ‘seeing that’, and 
his emphasis on the intertwining of our talk into our seeing at the moment of 
our looking at what is to become ‘a something’ for us, that is crucial. 
He illustrates the working of this influence, and its results, by use of the 
following figure 1: 
Figure 1: 
About figure 1, he remarks: “Your retinas and visual 
cortices are affected as much as mine are; our sense-
datum pictures would not differ. Surely we could all 
produce an accurate sketch of figure 1. Do we see the 
same thing? I see a bear climbing the other side of a 
tree” (pp. 12-13). For those who have never seen this 
drawing before, his talk of ‘a bear’ can produce an ‘oh 
yes, now I get it’ reaction. 
The point is, not so much that the word ‘bear’ 
gives us a particular picture (a mental representation) 
of an entity, but that the word ‘bear’ arouses in us all 
sorts of transitory understandings and action guiding anticipations (Bakhtin 
1986, Shotter 2005), so that we are able, in practice, not only to know 
‘where’ we are, so to speak, but also how to ‘go on’4 to entertain a whole 
range of further specific possibilities (but not just any). Thus, as Hanson re-
                                          
4  As we shall see, Wittgenstein (1953) talks of understanding as being, not something 
that happens mysteriously inside someone’s head, but as something that a person be-
comes able, in practice, to do: “Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ 
at all. – For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort 
of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, ‘Now I know how to go on’, when, 
that is, the formula has occurred to me?” (no. 154). 
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marks, “seeing a bear in figure 1 [is] to see that were the ‘tree’ circled we 
should come up behind the beast” (ibid. 20), and (most likely) see the bear’s 
head towards the top of the tree and its tail towards the bottom of the tree (for 
bears do not usually climb up or down trees with their bodies inverted), and 
so on. In other words, by our use of certain words at an appropriate moment, 
we can not only draw people’s attention to a particular feature of their sur-
rounding circumstances, but arouse in them a range of action guiding antici-
pations as to where they might look next for the next possible events occur-
ring in the situation depicted. He further points out how our talk intertwined 
gesturing (in words or in other of our actions) towards aspects of a shared 
(visual or other) circumstance can also influence our ways of looking, thus to 
see a meaning in an aspect of our circumstances. 
Ochs et al. (1996) describe research situations in the physics in which just 
such activities occur. In a discussion amongst a set of solid state physicists 
researching into phase transitions, a researcher moves towards a diagram on 
the blackboard depicting phase change transitions and, while pointing first to 
the right of the diagram and then to the left, says: “When I come down I’m in 
the domain state” (Ochs et al. 1996: 331). The others in the room ‘get it’ and 
begin to raise further questions about phase transitions: “Overwhelmingly, in-
terlocutors are looking at, gesturing towards, and/or touching locations within 
these graphic spaces as they say utterances such as ‘And now I continue 
down in temperature’, ‘If I come in this way (0.5 sec pause) and go he:re 
there’s no decay’, or ‘Why don’t I go: to the long range ordered phase in the 
Kleeman experiment’” (ibid. 357).5 Indeed, the physicists seem quite incapa-
ble of communicating without jumping up to interweave what they have to 
say with pointings at and/or sketchings on the blackboard. 
As Ochs et al. (1996) point out, the interlocutors are living in an unsettled, 
multi-dimensional, liminal context, i.e., a context which is still only on the 
threshold of being determined. Thus, in the unfolding movement of the labo-
ratory discussion, it is still possible to direct each other’s attention to many 
different possible aspects of the relevant phenomena, all currently co-present, 
any one of which might at some point be of importance in determining the fi-
                                          
5  : indicates the stretching of a vowel sound, while ___ indicates emphasis. 
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nal outcome of their research. And it is only in the little dramas that they 
stage, that they can create between them at each moment in the context of 
their discussions a sufficiently determinate sense of ‘where’ they are and 
what their ‘next step’ might be, that they can all as research physicists agree, 
as to what their current laboratory results show with respect to what their next 
experiments should be. 
In other words, in ‘seeing that’ the fragments (parts) presented in the illus-
trations point toward a certain whole – in the context of which they have their 
specific meaning – we are able in a kind of hermeneutical, part-whole proc-
ess, to anticipate what we might see in our further visual involvements with 
the entity in question. For instance, Hanson (1958) notes: “Seeing a bird in 
the sky involves seeing that it will not suddenly do vertical snap rolls [i.e., a 
stall leading into inverted flight],6 and this is more than marks on the retina. 
We could be wrong. But to see a bird, even momentarily, is to see it in all 
these connections... every perception involves an aetiology and a prognosis” 
(ibid. 21, my emphasis). It is both this placing of an event into a temporal, be-
fore and after context, and being able to responsibly account to others for that 
placing – as Ochs et al.’s (1996) physicists do – that is crucial to the creating 
of a new way of seeing among a group of co-participants and co-researchers.  
Frontier thinking 
So: Although a number of people may confront a certain event, would they 
all see ‘the same thing’? No, we must answer, for “the ways in which they are 
visually aware are profoundly different. Seeing is not only the having of vis-
ual experience; it is also the way in which the visual experience is had” (Han-
son 1958). In other words, what is often at issue between scientists in a re-
search science, is not so much how to describe (represent) its current subject 
matter accurately; it is a matter also of saying also what next it might be – a 
difference between not what the facts currently are, but a matter of the differ-
ent ways in which they might all ‘hang together’ in constituting a larger 
whole, thus to give each its meaning in relation to that whole.  
                                          
6  Hanson was a qualified aeroplane pilot and knew about such things as ‘snap rolls’! 
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To bring out what he means here, Hanson compares Mach’s use of a for-
mulaic proposition in carrying out a calculation with Hertz’s use of it. Both 
would, he shows, get exactly the same answer. But while Mach “construed 
dynamical laws as summary descriptions of sense observations,” Hertz 
treated them as “highly abstract and conventional axioms whose role was not 
to describe the subject-matter but to determine it” (ibid. 118) – the difference 
between an ‘after-the-fact’ (Mach) and a ‘before-the-fact’ (Hertz) use of the 
formula. This would mean that, “though they get the same answer to the 
problem, the difference in their conceptual organization guarantees that in
their future research they will not continue to have the same problems” (ibid. 
118, my emphasis). The difference between them – to do with the connec-
tions and relations they sense as existing within the phenomena of their in-
quiries – would show up “only in ‘frontier’ thinking – where the direction of 
new inquiry has regularly to be redetermined” (ibid. 118). 
These differences might seem to be subtle differences mattering very little 
in practice. And indeed, as Hanson (1958) shows, in doing calculations, mak-
ing predictions, and in providing explanations when working with scientific 
formulae, these two scientists might not differ at all. But, as Hanson (1958) 
makes clear, to try to force the thinking of workers in a research science into 
the mould of classical text-book sciences (in which creativity is supplanted 
by systematizing), when they are in fact creating new possible forms of re-
search, is to mislead ourselves into thinking that new research is merely a 
matter of rearranging old facts into new formal patterns, into thinking that it 
is a task, essentially, of a quantitative kind. Whereas, the task of making a 
unique, once-only, first-time sense of a bewildering phenomenon, is a task of 
quite a different, qualitative kind – it is, as we shall see, not so much a diffi-
culty of the intellect, i.e., a problem that can be solved by thinking, as a diffi-
culty of the will, which needs resolving in a struggle of a more practical kind 
(see Wittgenstein 1980: 17; and the discussion below). For it is to do with 
changing our taken-for-granted, ‘background’ ways of making sense of the 
phenomena before us. But again, it is not enough for an individual to make 
such a change merely within themselves; they must both be able to instruct 
others in the new way of seeing, and to give such others good reasons, i.e., to 
responsibly account, for such a way of viewing the phenomena in question.   
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Wittgenstein’s ways with words 
Modern philosophy has always been in the thrall of science. It is only by fol-
lowing “the secure path of a science,” said Kant in his Critique of Pure Rea-
son in 1787, that philosophy can become more than “a merely random grop-
ing” (Kant 1970: 17). And even now, we are still under that spell, the belief 
that there is a form or pattern of reasoning, a methodology, that we must fol-
low if we are to overcome the difficulties we face in our lives. 
Difficulties of the intellect versus difficulties of the will 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) great achievement in his later philosophy is to have 
broken this spell, to have made it very clear to us that many of our difficulties 
are not of the form of problems that can, by the application of a science-like 
methodology, be solved by reasoning; nor are they are not “empirical prob-
lems” that can be solved by discovering something currently unknown to us. 
They are difficulties of a quite another kind: they are difficulties of the will
rather than of the intellect; that is, they are orientational or relational difficul-
ties, to do with the how we spontaneously respond to features in our sur-
roundings with appropriate expectations and anticipations as to how next to 
‘go on’ with our activities within them without (mis)leading ourselves into 
taking an inappropriate next step7.
“What makes a subject hard to understand – if it’s something significant 
and important,” he says (Wittgenstein 1980: 17), “is not that before you 
can understand it you need to be specially trained in abstruse matters, but 
the contrast between understanding the subject and what most people want
to see. Because of this the very things which are most obvious may be-
come the hardest of all to understand. What has to be overcome is a diffi-
culty having to do with the will, rather than with the intellect.” 
Thus, if we are to overcome difficulties of this kind we must work on our 
ways of seeing things, on what we expect of them. For, as he makes clear to 
us, our ways of talking can exert powerful, directive effects on us, uncon-
sciously, without our being easily able to deliberate on how we might, in the 
                                          
7  “A philosophical problem has the form: “I don’t know my way about” (1953, no. 123). 
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course of our thought and talk, take pause, and seek alternative paths to those 
seemingly indicated by our current ways of ‘going on’. 
Such difficulties, he suggests, can be overcome “by looking into the work-
ings of our language... in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: 
in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by 
giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Phi-
losophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language” (1953, no. 109).  
Wittgenstein’s positive’ grammatical investigations 
Our ways of thinking, talking, and acting are too familiar to us. We are not 
very aware of the part our words can play in giving shape to, or in organizing, 
our thinking, talking, and acting. Although we have talked in the past of 
thought as calculation, or as information processing, if Wittgenstein (1953) is 
correct8, then we must think of our words, or better, our speaking – the inner 
mental movements we make in the uttering of our words – as being a very 
important medium of thought also.9
In his ‘grammatical’ investigations, he has focussed our attention on at 
least two aspects of their role in our thinking: 1) Negatively, so to speak, on 
the bewitchments they can mislead us into in our unreflective uses of our 
words; but also (2) positively, on how we can come to a clear understanding 
of an actual occasion of word-use by means of an appropriate description of 
                                          
8  Along with many others, of course, notable among them being Vygotsky (1978, 1987), 
Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986), and Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1968). 
9  Elsewhere (Shotter 2005), I have emphasized the importance of Bakhtin’s (1981, 
1986) relationally-responsive account of our understanding of people’s words as they 
utter them (in contrast to the usual representational-referential account of their mean-
ing once uttered). For, among the many other features of such responsive talk, is its 
orientation toward the future: “The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, 
oriented toward a future answer-word,” he says (Bakhtin 1981: 280, my emphasis), “it 
provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the answer’s direction. Form-
ing itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is at the same time deter-
mined by that which has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated 
by the answering word. Such is the situation of any living dialogue.” Wittgenstein 
(1953) notes this also: “It is in language that an expectation and its fulfilment make 
contact” (no. 445). 
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it: “Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it 
can in the end only describe it” (no. 124). Here, I will focus almost wholly on 
his ‘positive’ investigations. 
In Shotter (2005), I noted Bakhtin’s (1981) remark that: “Forming itself in 
an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is at the same time determined 
by that which has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact antici-
pated by the answering word” (Shotter (2005: 280). In other words, among 
the many other features of our spontaneously responsive, everyday talk, is its 
function in orienting us toward the future, thus to provide us with ways of or-
ganizing, or ‘orchestrating’, fragments of thought and talk, action and percep-
tion, etc., etc., into intelligible wholes. What Wittgenstein (1953) adds to 
Bakhtin’s general point here – in what he calls his grammatical investigations 
– is that if we attend to our actual use of words, we find that we use them in 
countless different ways, and our uses are both complex and uniquely inter-
twined in subtle detail into the deeds and actions of our lives.  
When considered in the abstract, as we do when theorizing or doing phi-
losophy, this complexity can be overwhelming. But what Wittgenstein shows 
us is that, if we pay close attention to particular details noticeable in particu-
lar concrete circumstances – to tones of voice, bodily movements and ges-
tures, facial expressions, eye direction, and so on – and thus place our every-
day utterances back into the circumstances of our everyday lives then, rather 
than bewildering us, the detailed relations between particularities within the 
complexity can arouse quite specific responses in us. He describes our 
changed way of attending to relevant phenomena thus: “we are tempted to 
say ‘only this can be really seen’ when we stare at unchanging surroundings, 
whereas we may not be at all tempted to say this when we look about us 
while walking” (1965: 66). He wants to consider our use of words “from 
within” the movements involved in our saying of them, rather than from the 
outside when we look only at the static forms of the words, i.e, what we fi-
nally said in our utterances. When we can survey the actual step-by-step 
movements made by a person (their ‘expressions’), in relation to each aspect 
of the ‘terrain’ to which these movements were related, then it becomes obvi-
ous to us why the person as he or she did. 
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For instance, in Katz and Shotter (1996), we were concerned to study 
what could be ‘heard’ by doctors in a patient’s voicing of her/his replies to 
the doctor’s questions. While Katz (as a co-practitioner-researcher) was ori-
ented toward noticing tones of ‘personal concern’ in a patient’s voice, the 
doctor wasn’t; the doctor’s concern was with the medical information pro-
vided in what the patient said; the doctor was thus oriented toward the patient 
simply as a source of such information. This, however, occasioned a cool and 
tense exchange, with expressions of anxiety by the patient. Katz’s suggestion 
to the doctor – that she attend to and respond to such expressions, and explore 
in some detail their meaning for the patient – worked to help the doctor create 
a very different kind of relationship, in which the medical examination pro-
ceeded in a much more warm, open, and worthwhile manner.  
We can see what Wittgenstein (1953) is doing in his grammatical investi-
gations in the same light: he is showing us how to display to ourselves, in the 
face of all the myriad forces that could be at work influencing us in what we 
do, how we might in fact achieve a resolution of them. 
Thus, in short, in bringing “words back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday use” (1953, no. 116), he changes our point of view from that of a 
contemplative observer to that of an agent in motion; and by spelling out the 
small details of our movements, enable us to appreciate our movements as if 
in ‘slow motion’. In so doing, we can begin to see how, in practice, we do in 
fact orient or relate ourselves to our surroundings, and it is this that dispels 
the need to hypothesize about special “mental processes” hidden inside our 
heads in attempts to account for our actual achievements. So, for instance, in 
discussing, say, feelings of confidence, instead of asking questions about the 
distinct brain states that might be involved, he attends to the actions and ex-
pressions out in the world: “Is our confidence justified? – What people accept 
as a justification – is shown by how they think and live. We expect this, and 
are surprised at that. But the chain of reasons has an end” (nos. 325, 326). 
Something that usually, as he says, “goes by so quick,” we would like to see 
it instead “as it were laid open to view” (1953, no. 435), and this can be done 
by setting an action within the details leading up to it, and those following 
from it. 
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As I mentioned above, besides these more ‘positive’ grammatical investi-
gations, besides these back and forth investigations into the diachronic links 
between words and their surrounding circumstances, Wittgenstein also inves-
tigates synchronic ones, the sideways linking of words simply with other 
words. Indeed, it is this particular aspect of language use, when people’s talk 
is not uniquely intertwined into the deeds and actions of their lives (rife 
among the talk of academics and intellectuals), that is the main target if his 
investigations. For, as he sees it, “philosophical problems arise when lan-
guage goes on holiday” (no. 38).  
This divorcing of words from the practical contexts within which they can 
have a specific use, occurs when sensible forms of talk are uttered in situa-
tions – usually by people seated in classrooms, seminar rooms, or conference 
halls – begin to cudgel their brains with such questions as: “What actually is
‘the scientific method’?” “What is practice?” “How do sentences manage to 
represent this rather than that state of affairs?,” and so on. While we might be 
able to depict (picture, represent) a set of supposed entities that the words 
‘method’, ‘practice’, and ‘represent’, and argue for the correctness of certain 
depictions over all others, no depiction as such would provide us with the 
way of seeing needed to anticipate seeing these activities in all their appropri-
ate relations with their surroundings. As Hanson (1958: 21) notes, to repeat, 
“every perception involves an aetiology and a prognosis.”  
Wittgenstein (1953) seeks, then, in his grammatical investigations to pro-
vide us with methods for describing the precise sequential intertwining of our 
speech with other movements, as our actions unfold in time, that enables us 
to sort out the actual meaning of our words from their possible, i.e., their 
meanings when unrelated to any actual practical circumstances. He brings out 
what is at issue here in a discussion of the circumstances surrounding an act 
of pointing: While there might be what can be called “characteristic experi-
ences” which seem to accompany acts of pointing, no one characteristic proc-
ess occurs in all cases. “Besides,” he adds, “even if something of the sort did 
recur in all cases, it would still depend on the circumstances – that is, on what 
happened before and after the pointing – whether we should say ‘He pointed 
to the shape and not to the colour’” (1953, no. 35). In other words, as in the 
situation of the research physicists depicted above, the nature of events on 
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their own is indeterminate; only when they are considered in relation to their 
possible places within larger schemes of events, can their nature be deter-
mined – but that ‘placement’ is still not a simple activity, much reflection, 
exploration, and discussion with others of other possibilities is required be-
fore a group can be satisfied that it has a way of seeing the phenomena that is 
now to be the topic of their research.  
‘Losing the phenomena’ and regaining them 
Above, then, without attempting to set out a comprehensive intellectual justi-
fication for action research, I have attempted to show that research modelled 
on the methods of finished, classical sciences, fails to capture (and must al-
ways fail to capture) those unique moments of human communication crea-
tive of new ways of seeing (and hearing, etc.) among a group of researchers. 
Presenting the arrived at results of one’s research in terms of a generalized 
theory representing a (possible) repetitive pattern in human events, inevitably 
occludes, erases, or ‘forgets’ the unique sequence of unique activities in-
volved creating a new way of looking (or listening, etc.) from one fragmen-
tary event to another (within a larger background situation) in such a way as 
to see (or hear) them all as constituting a nameable event. 
What is special about such moments is, not only that they are unique and 
fleeting, and occur always for “another first time” (as Garfinkel 1967: 9, puts 
it), but that they are intertwined in a uniquely sequenced way into a speaker’s 
embodied expression of certain words (and gestures, and other actions), and
also into the occurrence of certain other events shared by both speaker and 
listeners alike. And it is especially the specific (as opposed to the general) 
transitional understandings and action guiding anticipations (the concrete 
‘positionings’ and ‘pointings’) aroused by the precise use of certain words at 
certain moments in time that gives them their practical meaning – their ca-
pacity to (re)orient us toward new ways of seeing (and hearing). In other 
words, in speaking (and perhaps writing) out from within the ongoing activi-
ties within which we are currently engaged as researchers, we do not just 
‘point out’ relevant phenomena to others in our group, but in our talk and 
gesturing we also ‘point forward’, prospectively, to the possible next events 
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that might occur – that is, as researchers in a research science we must pro-
vide not just accurate knowledge but also actionable knowledge.
Sciences rooted in and modelled on “past scientific achievements” (Kuhn, 
1962, 1970: 10), and interested inachieving objective, decontextualized, gen-
eralized representations of states of affairs, independent of any unique events 
or unique individuals must of necessity ‘lose the phenomena’10 relevant to 
creating such new ways of looking. They fail to arouse in the finalized theo-
ries they provide, the ‘anticipations’ that guide us in seeking an event’s con-
nections with its surroundings that motivated us in its origination as a sci-
ence. Indeed, they do more, for in their production of finalized accounts of a 
state of affairs, they close off the road back to an understanding of these ori-
gins. 
This point is not new. Perhaps one of the earliest writers to point it out 
was Ludwik Fleck (1935/1979). As he shows in his historical account of the 
development of the Wasserman reaction (for the detection of syphilis), once a 
practice is established and working well, we tend to project back into it, 
falsely, both a clear origin and an orderly course of development, neither of 
which in fact it had. As Fleck (1979: 86 f.) puts it: “If after years we were to 
look back upon a field we have worked in, we could no longer see or under-
stand the difficulties present in that creative work. The actual course of de-
velopment becomes rationalized and schematized. We project the results into 
our intentions; but could it be any different?  We can no longer express the 
previously incomplete thoughts with these now finished concepts. Cognition 
modifies the knower so as to adapt him harmoniously to his acquired knowl-
edge. The situation ensures harmony within the dominant view about the ori-
gin of knowledge. Whence arises the ‘I came, I saw, I conquered’ epistemol-
ogy, possibly supplemented by a mystical epistemology of intuition.” 
                                          
10  I take the term ‘losing the phenomena’ from Garfinkel (2002), although Vygotsky 
(1987) also describes what is at issue very nicely: It can occur, he says, when we begin 
with “the decomposition of [a] complex mental whole into its elements...[where] its 
products are of a different nature than the whole from which they are derived... [This] 
results in products that have lost the characteristics of the whole...” (ibid. 45, my em-
phasis). 
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This is not, of course, an important issue in the medicine or the natural 
sciences, where the efficacy of a technique or technology is the desired out-
come. But if one’s task is to understand the human activities that go into the 
production of an institution or organized group capable of producing such 
outcomes, then an understanding of such a process – in which certain diffi-
culties are faced and overcome in the original work creative of the group – is 
of crucial importance to us.11 Since Fleck, many others have studied the ac-
tual everyday life activities of research scientists (e.g., Latour/Woolgar 1979; 
Knorr-Cetina 1981; Ochs et al. 1996; Spinosa/Dreyfus/Flores (1997) in even 
more ethnographic detail and have come to similar conclusions: naïve de-
scriptions of the scientific method, in which a theory is supposed to stand or 
fall according to the outcome of a single experiment, are utterly inconsistent 
with actual laboratory practice.  
Central to Latour and Woolgar’s (1979) work is their noting of the fact 
that research scientists continually collect figures, measurements, and that the 
end product of these figures is often “no more than a curve, a diagram, or a 
table of figures written on a frail piece of paper... [which] becomes a crucial 
resource in the construction of a ‘substance’” (ibid. 50)12 – in other words, 
the end product is, they say, an “inscription device.” But again, as in Fleck’s 
work, Latour and Woolgar (1979) note that what gets reported in journal arti-
cles is only the product of a whole lot of detailed interactive work, and the in-
teractive work creative of that product is itself is lost: “One important feature 
of the use of inscription devices in the laboratory is that once the end product, 
an inscription, is available, all the intermediary steps which made its produc-
tion possible are forgotten” (ibid. 63). In other words, Latour and Woolgar 
(1979) reaffirm Fleck’s finding: that the previously incomplete thoughts that 
                                          
11  Kuhn (1979), in his preface to Fleck (1979), remarks that, although he knew of the ex-
istence and title of Fleck’s book, and it gave him confidence “that the problems that 
concerned me had a fundamentally sociological dimension” (ibid. viii), “I am not sure 
that I took anything much more concrete from Fleck’s work, though I obviously may 
and undoubtedly should have” (ibid. ix). And he continues: “Rereading the book now, 
as I have done in the interim, I find many insights that I might fruitfully have worked 
into my viewpoint” (ibid. ix). However, Kuhn’s account of scientific discovery still 
prevails (especially in organizational studies) over that of Fleck. 
12  As in the Ochs et al. (1996) account, for example. 
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motived the actual research process – that constituted the “frontier thinking” 
described by Hanson (1958) – cannot be expressed within the now finished 
concepts that are a product of it. Again, however, we must note that Latour 
and Woolgar’s (1979) work focussed on activities within a successful natural 
scientific research culture, the neuroendocrinology research laboratory at the 
Salk Institute; they did not focus at all on groups of people who experienced 
themselves as subjected to a rigorous, scientifically controlled research proc-
ess.
In a now classic piece of work, in which he made explicit many of the un-
intended consequences implicit in attempts to implement rigorous research 
designs in experimental or field settings, Argyris (1974: 167) noted, among 
many other findings, that such attempts tended “to place subjects in situations 
that are similar, at worst, to the low-skill and, at best, to high-skill employees 
in organizations.” And one unintended consequence of this is that subjects 
can feel ‘picked on’, ‘pushed around’, ‘likely to found wanting’, as well as 
feeling anxious as to whether the research will have an effect ‘on their 
wages’, ‘on those they work with’, or ‘on their personal life’ – effects due to 
the imbalance of power and control researchers have over subjects. “It would 
make sense,” says Argyris (1974: 167), “to provide subjects with greater in-
fluence, with longer time perspective regarding, and greater internal in-
volvement in, the research project. It is understandable that researchers resist 
these suggestions. They argue that all research could be ruined if subjects had 
greater influence. These arguments are almost identical with the reactions of 
many executives when asked to consider giving greater influence to their em-
ployees in administration of the firm.” 
Fricke’s (1983) participatory research can be seen as a response to some 
of the difficulties raised by Argyris with respect to controlled and thus im-
posed research designs. By creating a situation in which it was “not a case of 
the researchers as outside experts training the workers but rather a situation 
where researchers and workers learned together” (ibid. 80), Fricke (like Ar-
gyris) found that the whole atmosphere changed. Workers, even after decades 
of work under extreme stress and in unskilled jobs, were willing, interested, 
and competent to participate in bettering their own working conditions ac-
cording to their interests. But yet again (as Argyris suggests above), Fricke 
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(1983) found that – because of the centralization of decision making at man-
agement level, the Taylorization of work, piece-rate payments systems, and 
suchlike – “the very organization of work institutionally disabled workers 
from using the practical insights and workplace-specific knowledge to im-
prove things” (ibid. 74).  
Work of this kind demonstrates the real possibilities for a move away 
from theory-driven research towards a much more practice-situated, action 
research approach to human affairs. Indeed, there is a crying need to mobilize 
the transitory knowledge people use in coping with the unique struggles they 
meet in the actual daily execution of tasks arising in their practices. For they 
are in a position to tell of their experiences in ways that ‘point forward’ in 
ways that are far more ‘moving’ than can conventional research with its ret-
rospective approach which can only provide ‘after the fact’ rationalizations of 
what practitioners have already done. 
A project that offers the ‘pointing forward’ kind of understanding dis-
cussed above, is Taptiklis’s (forthcoming) current storymaker project. He is 
concerned with inviting people to reflect on their working life within organi-
zations and to recall moments, episodes, or experiences that in hindsight 
seemed striking in some way. His purpose in doing this – a purpose that arose 
out of previous research on the struggles people faced in coping with “life 
events” and the need to help people to ‘navigate’ themselves through such 
events – was with the following question in mind: is it possible to find just 
that fragment of another person’s life that can help you decide what to do for 
yourself? 
Influenced by this experience, and by the work of a number of others who 
had also found that people give shape to their lives in terms of crucial “life 
events,” in particular Benner (1984), Taptiklis began the storymaker project, 
concerned to amass just such a repertoire of action guiding fragments of rele-
vance to workers in particular institutions. The example I will give is drawn 
from an inquiry conducted during 2004 with a team of experienced social 
workers in a national, New Zealand social work agency that had undergone a 
two-year experiment called a ‘strengths-based’ approach to child protection. 
Could the experiences gained be captured in a way that others – novices, per-
haps – could benefit from? Here’s an excerpt from one of the transcripts, in 
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which an experienced social worker who talks of how she successfully coped 
with a child in care, whom she ‘felt a lot for’, who ‘went missing’ while she 
herself was away on leave: 
Narrator: ... and she just took off and no-one could find her. 
I read it in the paper, and when I got back to work, and we found her, 
and so I went in and said 
what the hell do you think you’re doing.  
Don’t you ever do that again. 
People worry, blah, blah, blah blah, blah. 
I was quite staunch. I said, Just don’t do that. 
If you’ve got a problem...but I could see why she did it, because there  
was actually no-one there for her. 
The caregiver was gone, I wasn’t there, 
so she just did what she felt she needed to do. And anyway, 
a couple of days later she gave me that
(indicates greeting card) 
and for this girl to actually say sorry,
who would never admit to doing anything wrong, 
showed that it’s working. 
Portrayed in this vignette is the importance of the social worker’s care for the 
girl, and the girl’s noticing of it, so that when it wasn’t present, the girl felt 
alone and abandoned. Although some may protest at the seemingly uncon-
trolled expression of emotion and of her worry by the social worker towards 
the girl, its spontaneity is a genuine expression to the girl of her mattering to 
the social worker – a more controlled telling could easily be insincere. The 
action guiding power of this vignette is, then, I think, clear. The reformula-
tion of the ‘lesson’ here in the more formal terms of a protocol, policy, or 
general rule would leave practitioners in the position of ‘getting the picture’ 
but rob them of the felt action guiding movements such a vignette as this 
arouses. The rule or protocol would ‘lose the phenomena’ relevant to people 
understanding the meaning of the events in this vignette for them in their 
practice. 
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Conclusions 
Theory-oriented, academic social science researchers, speaking in seminar 
rooms and conference halls and writing research papers to be read (and criti-
cized) by their own fellow academics, face a quite different task to that of 
practice-based action researchers, who must speak with and write for (and 
sometimes with) those with whom they are conducting their inquiries. Thus 
action researchers, like the research physicists discussed above, must speak 
and write out from within the ongoing activities within which they are cur-
rently engaged in such a way that, they do not just ‘point out’ relevant phe-
nomena to others in the group, they must also ‘point forward’, prospectively, 
to the possible next events that might occur – in other words, they must pro-
vide not just accurate knowledge but also actionable knowledge. On the other 
hand, academic researchers write about earlier, already completed events that 
happened when they were involved with those whose activities are now the 
topic of their talk. And they must produce accurate and adequate linguistic 
representations of the nature of that activity while looking back at it, retro-
spectively, but now from outside their involvement in it, with the task of de-
scribing its form or patterning thus to produce a theoretical order that they 
can claim to have ‘discovered’ in it. Then next, before being able to ‘pass on’ 
their ‘theoretical findings’ to be ‘applied’ by the subjects of their research, 
they must submit their findings to the critical scrutiny of their academic col-
leagues, who examine whether they are logically justified in making their 
claims (or not) on the basis of the data they have collected – only if it can 
pass this ‘test’ is the claimed knowledge deemed good enough for applica-
tion. 
In the social and behavioural sciences, little theoretical knowledge as such 
passes through this process unscathed. But irrespective of it surviving this 
‘gladiatorial’ process, could such representational forms of knowledge ever 
be ‘applied’? In separating an activity from both the people whose activity it 
was and from its surrounding circumstances, in the interests of producing 
general, decontextualized, objective knowledge, theory-oriented and theory-
producing researchers must separate the activity studied from the practical 
88 John Shotter 
part it played in these people’s lives and from its point for them. And rightly 
so, for this was not their concern: They must locate whatever they say or 
write, primarily, in their own professional academic context (it must be ad-
dressed to those who, especially in promotion and tenure committees, will 
judge them), and it must direct attention towards what their professional col-
leagues, with their methodological requirements, deem it important to attend 
to. And their aim is to produce explanatory theories, i.e., representations of 
states of affairs that enable those in possession of them to predict and control 
the events they represent. In other words, this is knowledge of use to outsid-
ers concerned to manage and administrate the activities of others – a quite 
different aim from that of producing actionable knowledge for use by those 
others. 
It is no wonder that mainstream social scientists, who are oriented towards 
their gaining and sustaining a reputation in their journals, seminars, and con-
ferences, have, as the editors of this special issue point out, little knowledge 
of or experience with action research. 
Yet, this need not be the case. It is not as if theory-oriented academic re-
searchers were totally bereft of all kinds of important experiences and under-
standings arising out of their involvements with those they research on and 
into outside of the university context. Neither is it the case that their knowl-
edge of theoretical concepts is of no use in illuminating the activities of oth-
ers: the opposite is the case. But the difficulty here of turning this knowledge 
in a different direction is not an intellectual difficulty, a problem that can one 
day be solved by the right kind of discovery, but an orientational or relational 
difficulty, a difficulty of the will (see the discussion above) – a difficulty that 
can be overcome by devising ways of communicating what they know to oth-
ers in forms which do ‘point forward’ to next possible events, ways of com-
municating which do arouse anticipations in other of what next to expect 
within a particular circumstance. 
What I have attempted to do above, then, is to explore some aspects of the 
nature of research sciences, i.e., of sciences that function to bring new objects 
of inquiry into existence, with the question in mind: with what kind of sci-
ence should action research be compared? Where clearly, it is with a research 
rather than a classical science that I think the appropriate comparison should 
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be made. Action research would then be seen in a very different light for, as 
is already very clear, as Hanson’s (1958) Wittgenstein-inspired inquiries 
show, such research sciences have a very different structure to them than the 
‘classical’ forms that can developed from them, once the basic nature of their 
object of inquiry has been established.  
But how can it be established? What is it that makes a research science a 
successful research science? Clearly, prior to, and during the conduct their 
experimental manipulations and the making of their observations, a commu-
nity of scientific researchers must all be able to communicate amongst them-
selves in nonmisleading, unconfusing ways about uniquely new possibilities 
not yet actualized; and to do this, they need ways of checking out each 
other’s claims then-and-there, in the ongoing context of their employment. 
Thus, just as in everyday life situations, scientists also must be able to distin-
guish between that for which they are responsible, and that which merely 
happens, irrespective of their agency. For, only if they can sense, when acting 
in accord with their expectations of what the world might be like, whether the 
results of their actions accord with, or depart from their expectations, can 
they ever put them to empirical test. People’s sense of their own responsibil-
ity for their actions is, then, at the very basis of a research science. Scientists 
lacking any sense of their own participation in events occurring around them 
would be unable to do experiments. In other words, scientists in a research 
science (as well as a classical science for that matter) face communication 
problems not unlike those faced in action research.  
But what is achieved in a successful research science as in a piece of suc-
cessful action research, clearly, is not at all the same as the more tangible 
achievements (and their derived technologies) attributed to a mature classical 
science. Successful action research and research sciences give birth to new 
communities whose members are all oriented in the same, or similar ways, 
towards seeing events in their surroundings (the situation of their inquiries) as 
interlinking with each other in anticipated ways, i.e., as inter-related parts of 
the same unity. 
As I see it, then, what is common both to the conduct of (the early stages) 
of scientific research and to action research, is a realm of creative human ac-
tivity to do with establishing possibly new human communities. Within this 
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sphere, people develop, not only new ways of relating themselves to each 
other, but also as a result, new ways of relating themselves to the ‘other-
nesses’ in their surroundings as well. It is in the task of inquiring into the na-
ture of these early stages in the development of such communities that, I 
think, Wittgenstein’s (1953) special kind of practical philosophy has its ap-
plication. For, as he himself puts it, his kind of philosophy “simply puts eve-
rything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – Since every-
thing lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for ex-
ample, is of no interest to us. One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what 
is possible before all new discoveries and inventions” (no. 126).  
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